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ABSTRACT
A growing body of academic and policy research seeks to understand and
address the problem of contemporary unfree labour. In this article, we
argue that this literature could be strengthened by a stronger
conceptualization of, and more systematic attention towards, the role of
national states. In particular, we argue that there is a need to move
beyond simplistic conceptualisations of states as simple agents of
regulation and criminal justice enforcement who respond to the
problem of unfree labour, and to recognize the causal and multifaceted
role that national states play in creating the conditions in which unfree
labour can flourish. We propose a framework to understand and
compare the ways in which national states shape the political economy
of unfree labour. Focusing on the United States, we outline three arenas
of governance in which national states have been particularly central to
enabling the conditions for unfree labour: the regulation of labour
mobility, labour market regulation, and business regulation. We
conclude by reflecting on the comparative political economy research
that will be required to understand the role of different states in
shaping the conditions in which unfree labour thrives or is eliminated.
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Unfree labour, which encompasses exploitative practices often described as forced labour, human
trafficking, and ‘modern slavery’, is a stable feature of the contemporary global economy. Unfree
labour has been well documented as a core component of several industries ranging from mica
mining to seafood processing, and is especially pervasive in low value-added and labour intensive
activities like those found within agriculture, construction, and some forms of manufacturing
(Verité 2017). Unfree labour tends to thrive in outsourced portions of labour and product supply
chains (Phillips 2013, Crane et al. 2017), and has been documented to occur in both developed
(Fudge and Strauss 2013, LeBaron 2015, Crane et al. 2017) and developing economies (McGrath
2013, Phillips 2013, Mezzadri 2016). Although unfree labour takes a variety of forms in the contem-
porary global economy, at its core unfree labour involves the use of coercion or compulsion to extract
labour from workers. In the business context, unfree labour often involves deception at the point of
entry into work, as well as coercion that precludes workers from exiting labour relationships that are
highly exploitative. Common attributes of unfree labour include debt bondage, manipulation of con-
tracts and credit, violence and threats of violence against workers or their families, and the predatory
overcharging of workers for services such as accommodation or recruitment fees.
In recent years, both scholarly debates and policy discussions about the global problem of unfree
labour have been gathering pace. While this new wave of scholarship on unfree labour has lent fresh
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and valuable insights into its extent, nature and dynamics, there remains a weak link – namely, the
question of how national states fit into the picture. States are commonly incorporated in indirect
fashion into the theoretical, analytical and empirical frameworks for understanding the political
economy of unfree labour, lurking in the background but rarely being brought to the centre of atten-
tion. The result is that their central role in shaping the global conditions that facilitate the emergence
and persistence of unfree labour remains obscured and under-emphasised.
In large parts of the scholarly debate, this lack of systematic attention to states stems from theor-
etical approaches to understanding the relationship between capitalism and unfree labour. Both
Marxist and neoclassical debates about unfree labour in the capitalist economy have centred on
the capital-wage labour relation, particularly around questions of value and agency (Fogel and Enger-
man 1974, Brass and van der Linden 1997, Rao 1999, Guérin 2013). The prioritisation of debates about
whether and under what conditions unfree labour can be considered ‘capitalist’ or not – within an
abstract and often economistic conception of capitalism – has meant that very little scholarship
has focused explicitly on the role of states or other political actors. Rather, the state has frequently
been collapsed into the capital-labour relation, by means of particular assumptions about the
relationship of states to the capitalist economy. Especially in recent Marxist scholarship on unfree
labour, this has led to a certain invisibility for the state and state actors, insofar as they are conceived
as an extension of capital carrying little intrinsic or autonomous interest.1
The sidelining of states is also characteristic of large parts of policy approaches to the problem of
unfree labour – usually in these circles termed forced labour or human trafficking – and in the policy-
based literature that has been growing rapidly since the mid-2000s (e.g. United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime 2012, International Organization for Migration 2017). One of its most evident mani-
festations is found in the dominant typologies of forced labour produced by international organis-
ations and governments. The most influential typology is that of the International Labour
Organization (ILO) (2005, 2014), which identifies three forms of forced labour: forced labour exploita-
tion, forced sexual exploitation, and state-imposed forced labour. The former has globally the highest
incidence, with the ILO estimating that 18.7 million (90 per cent) are exploited in the private
economy, by individuals or enterprises (ILO 2014: 7). Yet the implication here – and in much other
output from the ILO – is that the state is only present in one of these forms, namely state-
imposed forced labour, as a key structure or agent. In short, forced labour exploitation is often
taken to be perpetrated by private individuals or firms in the ‘private economy’, whose actors and
dynamics are deemed separate from states.
This is not to suggest that states are entirely overlooked in the policy-based literature. Indeed, a
great many policy actors with different approaches populate this arena, and states are often the
subject of extensive attention, particularly in relation to issues such as immigration policy. Neverthe-
less, states are often considered predominantly as the vehicles for responses to forced labour, rather
than as actors who play a causal role in shaping the conditions that give rise to it. Hundreds of reports,
articles, and books from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations, aca-
demics, and governments illustrate this trend in important parts of the policy arena. To take just
one, the ILO’s influential 2014 report, Profits and Poverty: The Economics of Forced Labour, goes as
far as to portray states not only as the solution to unfree labour but also as a victim of it. It argues
that ‘unscrupulous employers and criminals reap huge profits from the illegal exaction of forced
labour’, harming victims, law-abiding businesses, and ‘governments and societies’, who are
‘harmed because the profits generated by forced labour bypass national tax collection systems’.
The report notes that the available data on unfree labour ‘provides a compelling argument for stron-
ger government intervention’ and that ‘measures are needed to strengthen laws and policies and
reinforce inspection in sectors where the risk of forced labour is high’ (ILO 2014: 45, 47). Similarly,
the United States Trafficking in Persons Report extensively discusses the efforts that states are
taking to respond to various forms of unfree labour through law enforcement and criminal justice
prosecution, but there is little acknowledgement of the role played by states in facilitating the use
of these forms of exploitation by business (US Department of State 2017: 17).
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Our aim is to help move beyond conceptualisations of states as policy responders, or simple
agents of regulation and criminal justice enforcement, towards a robust and historically informed pol-
itical economy analysis that can elucidate the ways in which shifts in state power and policy have
played a significant role in facilitating unfree labour. We develop this argument by first setting out
a theoretical and analytical perspective on how we can think about states in the political economy
of unfree labour, calling for a greater comparative research effort to illuminate the role of states in
shaping the dynamics of unfree labour across the world. In Table 1 in this section, we summarise
the roles that national states play in the political economy of unfree labour, in order to contextualise
our own subsequent empirical discussion and provide a schematic starting point for future compara-
tive and theoretical research.
In the following sections, we take the United States (US) as an illustrative empirical focus. We have
selected the US because by most measures, it is the world’s largest economy (Kose et al. 2017) and
unfree labour plays a significant role within it. Although there is no reliable country-level quantitative
estimate for the scale of unfree labour within the US, since prevalence research is in its early stages
(LeBaron 2018),2 sector- and population-based research have established unfree labour as playing a
key role within several industries, including agriculture, the service sector, and domestic work (Zhang
2012, Owen et al. 2014). The ILO estimates that developed economies such as the US have the highest
annual profit per victim of forced labour, with the annual profit per victim estimated at US$34,800
(compared to US$3900 in Africa and US$5000 in Asia-Pacific) (ILO 2014). Our discussion focuses on
Table 1. State strategies and unfree labour.
Conditions of vulnerability Conditions of profitability
Direct . Directly imposed unfree labour (e.g. prison
labour)
. Non-enforcement of labour legislation and
laws prohibiting forced labour, child labour,
trafficking
. Maintenance of migrant work programmes
that remove labour rights and protections
against forced labour
. Failure to regulate labour recruitment
industry or enforce regulation against
abusive labour recruitment practices
. Differential distribution of labour protections
on basis of gender, race, caste, ethnicity,
nationality, age, place of birth, etc.
. Failure to extend sufficient protection to
identified victims of forced labour or
trafficking, or provide viable employment
alternatives
. Facilitation of labour recruiters and
intermediaries which enable exploitation
. Facilitation of industries and business
practices that lead to systematic abuse
. Non-enforcement of trade law or ethical
norms prohibiting import and export of
goods made using unfree labour
. Non-prosecution of businesses which use
forced labour or fail to act proactively to
remove forced labour from their supply
chains
. Maintenance of permissive laws or legal
‘loopholes’ facilitating labour exploitation e.g.
child labour
Indirect . Restrictive policies governing mobility and
migration
. Labour market policy placing downward
pressure on wages and conditions
. Policies that restrict workers’ rights to
organisation and unionisation
. Education policy governing differential
access to education, levels of literacy and
development of capabilities
. Policies which distribute social and labour
rights unequally on the basis of gender, race,
caste, ethnicity, class, age, nationality, place
of birth, etc.
. Non-enforcement of laws prohibiting
discrimination on the above criteria
. Policies that facilitate the concentration of
private ownership of land, food, and water
. Deregulation so as to facilitate wealth
creation and concentration; policies to boost
competitiveness by decreasing protections
for workers
. Promotion of corporate self-regulation and
private governance in the arena of labour
standards, social and welfare policy
. Exemption for transnational investor firms
from new or existing labour and social laws
. Lack of regulation of debt and credit markets
that facilitate debt bondage
. Under-resourcing or de-funding of labour
inspectorates
. ‘Outsourcing’ of labour inspection and
enforcement functions to private actors (e.g.
auditors)
. Failure to develop effective supply chain
regulation encompassing extra-territoriality
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outlining three arenas of governance in which the US state has been particularly central to enabling
the conditions for unfree labour to flourish. The first relates to the regulation of labour mobility, the
second to labour market regulation, and the third to business regulation.
Our discussion within each of these arenas seeks to draw together and develop three literature-
based propositions: (1) that states affect unfree labour through their governance of migration, and, in
the contemporary US, punitive mobility and border control regimes have strengthened the industry
associated with trafficking for labour exploitation; (2) that states affect unfree labour through labour
market policy, and, in the contemporary US, laws that curtail workers’ rights have enhanced vulner-
ability to exploitation including unfree labour; and (3) that states affect unfree labour by empowering
employers to exploit workers, and, in the contemporary US, the failure to enforce labour standards
and the devolution of responsibility for enforcement facilitates employers’ use of unfree labour.
These propositions emerge from a wide range of scholarly literatures, and particularly those on
migration, labour law, and private business regulation, respectively. There is clearly some overlap
between these literatures, but they have nevertheless tended to be siloed across various disciplines
and academic communities and have too rarely been brought into engagement with one another.
We seek to move debates onwards by synthesising and developing these propositions, and by high-
lighting the multi-faceted ways through which states influence vulnerability to unfree labour and
businesses’ demand for it in the contemporary global economy. We return in the conclusions to
the bigger picture, and draw on our scheme in Table 1 to reflect on the future comparative and theor-
etical agenda for the study of states in the political economy of unfree labour.
Two clarifications are in order before we proceed. The first is that our focus here is on forms of
unfree labour associated with forced labour and trafficking for labour exploitation in the US
economy. We do not focus directly on those varieties which occur in the social reproductive
sector, such as care work or sex work, although there are important points of convergence and we
are hopeful that these will be fully taken up within the future comparative political economy research
required to advance this line of inquiry. We also focus on the forms of unfree labour which identifiably
occur within the territorial boundaries of the US state. A comprehensive exploration of unfree labour
in the US economy would need to take into account those forms of exploitation which occur outside
its national borders in the global production networks which feed the US economy and into which it
is integrated. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper: our focus is, in this instance, on forms of
unfree labour and exploitation among workers physically located in the United States in sectors and
workplaces which are directly governed by the authority of the US state.
The second concerns our use of the concept of ‘unfree labour’. This concept is contentious and its
definition has been widely debated within the literature on severe exploitation (see Miles 1989, Banaji
2003, O’Connell Davidson 2010, Strauss 2012, Morgan and Olsen 2015, LeBaron 2018). It is beyond the
scope of our paper to resolve these debates. It suffices to note that unfree labour involves work that is
involuntary and from which workers face severe constraints on their ability to exit, but our purpose is
not to resolve controversies about precisely what level of ‘involuntariness’ is required, and what form
preclusion to exit must take, for labour to qualify as ‘unfree’. Yet we consider the concept of ‘unfree
labour’ to be more appropriate in the context of our paper than the international legal definition of
‘forced labour’, defined in the ILO’s 1930 Forced Labour Convention (ILO 2012, 2014) as ‘all work or
service which is exacted under menace of any penalty for its non-performance and for which the
worker concerned does not offer himself voluntarily’. This is so for two reasons. First, the ILO defi-
nition is too narrow. In subsequent interpretations and elaborations of the 1930 definition, the ILO
has expressly excluded economic forms of coercion (e.g. starvation), as well as certain forms of
state-imposed forced labour (e.g. some forms of prison labour) from its definition of forced labour.
We deem these to be critical to the global political economy of unfree labour, and, especially, to
understanding the role of states within it. Second, the concept of forced labour is often used in
ways that suggest a neat binary between ‘free’ and ‘forced’ labour. We view this as problematic
since many forms of ‘free’ labour also involve considerable levels of exploitation, and in low-
waged sectors workers often move between the categories of unfree labour and other forms of
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exploitation throughout their lives. Like most scholars who prefer the concept of unfree labour, we
recognise the role of economic coercion in instantiating unfreedom and resist the notion that there is
a neat separation between ‘free’ and ‘unfree’ labour, given the porousness and blurring of boundaries
between these categories at the level of workers’ daily lives.
States in the global political economy of unfree labour
Unfree labour is far from being a new phenomenon. Its existence was not caused by contemporary
neoliberalism at the global or national level. Unfree labour exists across a wide array of political
systems, institutional forms, and modes of economic organisation. Yet, we suggest that an under-
standing of contemporary unfree labour needs to be connected to an understanding of neoliberal
globalisation, inasmuch as this dominant set of ideological, political and economic processes has
shaped the forms that unfree labour has taken in the contemporary period and the mechanisms
by which they are produced and reproduced. Our key point for present purposes is that states,
whether those occupying dominant positions of power in the global political economy or those
which are manifestly less powerful, are among the key architects of the neoliberalism, both nationally
and globally, and by extension are central to shaping the context in which contemporary unfree
labour can flourish.
This may seem like a straightforward point to a critical political economist, but it is one that goes
against the grain of large swathes of the literature on contemporary unfree labour, and especially
liberal conceptualisations that understand unfree labour’s roots to lie in the ancient past. Kevin
Bales’ influential account, for instance, explains ‘the new slavery’ in the global economy as being
rooted in a trans-historical relationship between ‘the poor’ and ‘the violent’, which emerged in
ancient times and continues in the contemporary capitalist economy (Bales 2012). Although Bales
– and the literature more broadly – make frequent reference to the role of ‘globalisation’ in perpetu-
ating unfree labour, such references remain superficial and stand awkwardly alongside suggestions
that global economic forces can also help to eradicate unfree labour (Datta and Bales 2013). At the
very least, reflection is needed on the core tension between understanding globalisation to be
among the root causes of unfree labour and the search for solutions which harness powerful econ-
omic and market forces to that end. In short, there is a need for much greater clarity regarding why
and how neoliberal globalisation has contributed to the dynamics of contemporary unfree labour,
and the role of national states within this picture.
The international political economy literature, particularly in its critical strands, offers rich perspec-
tives on how the agency of states has driven neoliberal globalisation across the world. Far from being
‘an inevitable outcome of inherently expansionist economic tendencies’ (Panitch and Gindin 2012:
vii), powerful states embarked in the 1970s on a massive political, economic, and ideological
project of global sweep and reach designed to free up market forces. Neoliberalism became a domi-
nant policy paradigm from the 1980s onwards, as states drove forward an ‘open-ended and contra-
dictory process of politically assisted market rule’ (Peck 2010: xii), championing individual freedoms,
property rights, and unfettered markets and trade, and a reversal of the Keynesian-era idea that an
active, interventionist state is necessary to counter the social impacts of market deficiencies and fail-
ures. It has entailed dramatic changes in approaches to economic regulation, including the adoption
of monetarist fiscal policy, the removal of barriers to competition, and the expansion and deepening
of markets and competitive pressures in many states (see Helleiner 1996, Harvey 2007).
As they implemented these and other far-reaching economic reforms designed to re-ignite growth
and free upmarket forces, states altered their relationship with private actors. They bolstered the power
of capital and business, and in particular, facilitated the accelerating power of financial capital, retail
corporations and transnational corporations (TNCs) in the global South (Harvey 2007, Lichtenstein
2010, Soederberg 2010, Hamilton et al. 2011). By devolving authority over markets and corporate
conduct directly to companies themselves, states opened the door to the heightened involvement
of private actors in economic governance processes, such that an increasingly ‘significant degree of
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global order is provided by individual firms that agree to cooperate, either formally or informally, in
establishing an international framework for their economic activity’ (Cutler et al. 1999: 3–4). Private gov-
ernance of this sort has not arisen independently of states; rather, the ongoing ‘delegation’ or ‘outsour-
cing’ of key governance functions to private actors, especially in relation to regulation, reflects the
active agency of states in promoting private governance and shaping the forms it takes (Bartley
2007, Abbott and Snidal 2009, Green 2014, Mayer and Phillips 2017).
As states bolstered the power and mobility of capital, they also redrew the relationship between
capital and labour. While the heightened vulnerability of workers is often portrayed as resulting from
the unprecedented growth and mobility of TNCs, and from the increasing emphasis on corporate
self-regulation, states have played a direct role in facilitating models of profitability that have
depended on diminished power and circumstances for massive portions of the labouring population.
Governments removed domestic and international barriers to competition in the labour market, and
enacted policies intended to undermine the social and collective power of labour, such as mass
layoffs, the replacement of public sector workers with private sector workers, strikebreaking and a
political offensive against unions (McNally 2011).
Unfree labour needs to be understood in this context, linked to an understanding of the power
relations inherent in neoliberal globalisation which are articulated both at the global level and
within national borders, and reflecting the interests and agency of states and economic actors.
Unfree labour today thrives across the global economy, in both the global North and global
South, and across a wide range of manufacturing, agricultural, extractive and other industries in
global production (Andrees and Belser 2009, Shelley 2010, US Department of Labor 2012, Verité
2012, Barrientos et al. 2013). Yet, in this context, the role of states in the political economy of
unfree labour remains empirically under-appreciated and theoretically marginalised, and needs to
be brought more satisfactorily to the centre of the debate. Sometimes, as noted earlier, unfree
labour regimes are directly institutionalised and sanctioned by states, such as in the US prison indus-
try (LeBaron 2015) or the Gulf states’ kafala system (Behbahani 2015). But most of the time, and par-
ticularly in the arenas of exploitation that interest us here, states do not themselves cause unfree
labour. Rather, through the political projects pursued to facilitate globalisation and engagement
with its various processes in the ways outlined above, they put in place the conditions in which indi-
viduals and groups of people become vulnerable to unfree labour, on the one hand, and, on the other
hand, the conditions in which these labour practices become feasible and coherent ‘management
practices’ (Crane 2013) and profitable business models for firms, employers and users of labour.
We conceptualise these two dimensions as intrinsically linked – as flip sides of a coin – wherein
these two sets of conditions are created simultaneously by particular strategies of state governance
and reinforce one another.
In Table 1, we offer a schematic summary of the key ways in which national states shape the pol-
itical economy of unfree labour, across these two dimensions of vulnerability and profitability. Our
aim in the table is to offer a framework both to contextualise our empirical discussion and to
provide a starting point for further research in this area. In some respects, states can be said to
play a very ‘direct’ role in the facilitation of unfree labour; in others, their role is more ‘indirect’,
wherein the conditions for unfree labour arise as a result of dynamics in wider policy and political
arenas. Extensive research will be required to understand and compare how such dynamics have
unfolded in different types of states and different political-economic contexts. The key point for
our purposes is that contemporary unfree labour cannot be understood anywhere without an
appreciation of the centrality of states, nor in isolation from the broader global political-economic
processes which shape their nature, power, and agency.
Table 1 sets out an expansive terrain for research which goes far beyond the possible remit of a
single paper. We seek therefore to cut into it here by focusing the case of the United States, and
exploring how the US state has shaped the conditions in which unfree labour is enabled. We
focus our attention on the three spheres of governance outlined earlier, where, in the US context,
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the state has been especially central to engineering the conditions in which unfree labour can thrive:
(a) the regulation of labour mobility; (b) labour market regulation; and (c) business regulation.
The regulation of labour mobility
In the United States, unfree labour is concentrated among migrant workers. It is not, as is commonly
assumed, a problem associated solely with undocumented migration; rather, circumstances of unfree
labour have been identified among workers who have entered the country both with and without
legal status (US Department of State 2016). Similarly, conditions of unfreedom may prevail from
the outset, when someone is moved into situations of forced labour from the start of the trafficking
process, or may occur among migrant workers within the United States. In all cases, migration and
mobility are common denominators, and constitute an important dimension of how the practices
of the US state shape the conditions in which unfree labour is enabled. Here, we open up the discus-
sion by focusing on border control and elements of the ‘migration industry’ connected with traffick-
ing, smuggling, and labour recruitment, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, immigration policy
and its tensions with labour law and trafficking policy.
Border control, the ‘migration industry’ and labour recruitment
The United States operates one of the most highly policed border systems in the world. Starting in the
1980s, successive waves of reform aimed to tighten the border, with the focus always on restricting
undocumented migration into the country. In the early 1990s, as public opinion on immigration
became more negative, the rhetoric of border control became increasingly strident and enforcement
campaigns expanded vigorously (Andreas 2000, 2001, Nevins 2002). The terrorist attacks of 11 Sep-
tember 2001 heralded an even more intense focus on both immigration and border policing, charac-
terised by a significant militarisation of the border, particularly the land border with Mexico. All of
these efforts failed to make any significant impression on the scale of undocumented migration;
to the contrary, we have seen a remarkably rapid adaptation by the human trafficking and smuggling
industry to the new realities of US border control policy.
To this extent, while it might be tempting to see the persistence and expansion of trafficking for
forced labour as the result of the increasing porousness of borders in the context of globalisation
(Shelley 2010: 42), such an explanation captures little of the situation in the US and other countries
which maintain restrictive immigration policies and aggressive border control. Instead, the trafficking
and smuggling industries have in fact been strengthened by tighter border enforcement, as their ser-
vices have become, as it were, a necessary evil for prospective migrants (Andreas 2001, Spener 2009).
Many of the small, local, freelance agents involved in the smuggling industry were squeezed out by
the border enforcement campaign of the 1990s, replaced by a small number of large, better organ-
ised and more skilled organisations whose ‘market position’ was significantly enhanced (Andreas
2001: 118–19). Routes, techniques of movement, networks and actors have all adapted and continue
to evolve, generating an often well organised and sophisticated form of transnational crime
(Zhang 2007).
More aggressive border control techniques have increased the risks for migrants, and at the same
time permitted massive increases in the prices charged by the increasingly sophisticated agents of
the migration industry (Andreas 2001: 116). High profits increase the incentives to traffickers and
smugglers to enter the industry and accept its risks, but also mean that people who make use of
their services pay huge sums of money which render them bound by very large debts to these
agents. The extent of the debt accrued in the context of a highly policed border enforcement
regime augments the unfreedom that can be imposed on a migrant worker. This is most straightfor-
wardly the case in trafficking situations, where a worker is trafficked into a situation of unfree labour
on the basis of the costs incurred in the movement across borders. Yet, it is also the case for
ostensibly ‘free’ migrant workers who owe money to smugglers, whose vulnerability to severe
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exploitation and forced labour is enhanced by the need to meet the onerous terms of debt repay-
ments, alongside the mechanisms of coercion and exploitation that are facilitated by their undocu-
mented status. Migrants can also be forced by smugglers to work at specific sites until the fees are
repaid (Verité 2015).
Beyond the trafficking and smuggling industries, labour recruiters occupy an increasingly salient
place in the migration industry across the world. While smugglers charge for the passage across the
border, labour recruiters charge to secure visas and place a person at work in the United States. A vast
network of labour recruiters operates both legally and illegally to supply an array of industries in the
US with temporary foreign workers, especially in sectors such as agriculture, construction, and man-
ufacturing. The use of recruiters and contractors has been shown in the United States and elsewhere
to be a means by which employers have sought to evade legal responsibility for hiring unauthorised
workers by involving third parties (Barrientos 2013, Phillips 2013), and such tactics of evasion have
been spurred by policy initiatives to increase sanctions on employers, as in the US Immigration
and Control Act of 1986 (Bump et al. 2011: 12, Hernández-Leon 2013: 29).
Between 2007 and 2016, it is estimated that intermediaries were involved in securing visas for
around 80 per cent of the 2 million foreign workers approved for low-skilled jobs in agriculture
and other sectors (Twohey et al. 2016). Some provide documented workers to employers through
legal channels; others facilitate the recruitment of undocumented workers, favoured by employers
for their easy ‘disposability’ and the absence of requirements in relation to wages and conditions.
Exploitative practices are rampant, with all the hallmarks of trafficking and unfree labour: the
illegal charging of exorbitantly high recruitment fees, making deductions from wages and manipu-
lating the terms of repayment so as continually to increase the debt, placing workers in squalid
living and transportation conditions, and engaging in deception concerning the conditions, location
and type of work. Given that workers are usually paid (in cash) by the recruiter rather than the user of
their labour, it can be difficult for the latter or for labour inspectors to determine the true level of
wages and the extent of violations (Verité 2010, 2015, Andrees et al. 2015: 2–3).
NGOs and others have drawn attention to the lack of regulation of labour recruiters, but passage
of appropriate legislation has been obstructed. The most significant attempt at comprehensive immi-
gration reform was the bipartisan Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modern-
ization Act (S744) that was passed by the Senate in mid-2013. This bill sought to combine another
renewed focus on border security with the creation of paths to citizenship for undocumented immi-
grants, an updated visa system, and a new set of regulatory mechanisms pertaining to labour recrui-
ters which were widely thought capable of significantly enhancing workers’ protections. However,
the House of Representatives refused to consider this bill or any other proposal for comprehensive
reform that went beyond the ‘enforcement narrative’ that came in the 2000s to dominate political
debate (Avedaño and Fanning 2013). Thus a fragmentation of policy responsibility remains, in
which recruitment agency licensing or registration regulations are generally determined at local
state level, while immigration and labour regulations pertaining to migrants, including temporary
migrant workers, are primarily issued at the federal level (Andrees et al. 2015: 46). An exception at
the federal level is the legislation encased in Executive Order 13627 of 2012, Strengthening Protec-
tions against Trafficking of Persons in Federal Contracts, which makes some provision relating to
recruitment practices through the mechanisms of supply chains.
Some regulatory provisions are also contained in key visa programmes, such as H-2A and H-2B,
where directly or indirectly charging foreign workers job placement, recruitment, or other fees
related to employment is prohibited, and disclosure of the terms of employment is required. In
2015, the Departments of Labor and Homeland Security issued new H-2B rules which required dis-
closure of foreign labour recruiters and their sub-contractors, and prohibited retaliation against
workers (US Department of State 2016). However, the problem is enforcement, particularly where
high fee charging and violations of anti-discrimination laws occur in countries of origin, such as
Mexico, avoiding the reach and scrutiny of regulators in the United States (Andrees et al. 2015:
50). At the same time, other policy areas have been thought to work against these goals: the
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Trafficking in Persons report issued annually by the State Department indicates that NGOs have
raised concerns that provisions in the Fiscal Year 2016 Appropriations Act increased some H-2B
workers’ vulnerability to trafficking (unfree labour) through such measures as reducing wage guaran-
tees, employers’ accountability for recruiting abuses, transparency and oversight (US Department of
State 2016).
Immigration policy, criminalisation, and labour law
In US immigration policy in the 2000s, the focus of the enforcement narrative came to be undocu-
mented migrants themselves, rather than the smugglers, traffickers or employers who exploit
them or subject them to forced labour (Shelley 2010: 259). Deportations of undocumented migrants
started to increase dramatically in the late 1980s, characterised by a sharp incline not in deportations
of undocumented workers per se, but rather in deportations of undocumented migrants convicted of
crimes, alongside summary deportation or ‘expedited removal’ at the border enabled by new legis-
lation in 1996 (Ellerman 2009: 22–4). There remain demanding quotas for the detention and removal
of undocumented migrants: in 2014, congressional mandates required US Immigration and Customs
Enforcement to fill a daily average of 34,000 beds in detention centres (Brennan 2014). These devel-
opments have inevitably intersected with a wider ‘criminalisation’ of migration, particularly since 9/11
and the passage of the Patriot Act, and the devolution of authority to states to pass immigration legis-
lation which has focused on the criminalisation of undocumented migrants (Sassen 2010). Particularly
notorious instances of state-level legislation of this kind were enacted in Arizona in 2010 and
Alabama in 2011, the latter case described as involving ‘the most draconian and oppressive set of
provisions that this country… has seen since the era of segregation’ (Caballero 2011).
One of the principal mechanisms of coercion and control over migrant workers is the threat of
denunciation to immigration authorities, and the already powerful disincentives to complain are
vastly enhanced in this context of criminalisation (Weil and Pyles 2006, Verité 2015). Employers
hiring undocumented workers have well-developed mechanisms for mobilising immigration law in
their favour, which include failing to comply with obligations to verify immigration status until a
worker tries to file a complaint or engage with a trade union, at which point employment can be ter-
minated with no penalty to the employer, retaliatory reporting to the immigration authorities as a
means of disposing of workers without incurring obligations under labour law, and loaning undocu-
mented workers equipment to set themselves up as self-employed, before hiring them as sub-con-
tractors (Bump et al. 2011: 10, 13). Fines and penalties for hiring undocumented workers are also
sometimes incorporated into a firm’s business model, where the benefits and profits are deemed
to outweigh the potential cost and risk, and firms frequently close and reopen under different
names in order to avoid sanction. One widely reported case of this practice involved a garments
factory in New York City manufacturing for GAP, Macy’s and other retailers, which withheld some
US$5.5 million in wages from its workforce, comprising mainly Chinese immigrants working under
conditions that approximated forced labour (Verité 2015).
In this context, labour inspectors frequently report concerns that they are unable to reach undo-
cumented workers and act on exploitation in the workplace, including in instances of forced labour
(Bump et al. 2011; author’s interviews3). Legal precedents also exist – such as the often-cited Hoffman
Plastic Compounds vs. the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) case of 2002 – in which undocu-
mented workers were deemed not to be entitled to back pay when illegally dismissed for being
involved in union activity. This ruling, found by both the International Labour Organization and
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to have violated international legal obligations, has not
always been upheld as a precedent in subsequent US cases, and undocumented workers are entitled
to claim rights and protection under other legislative umbrellas, such as the Fair Labor Act, Civil Rights
Act or health and safety legislation. Nevertheless, there is evidence that Hoffman exacerbated per-
ceptions among migrant communities that they lack protection in the workplace, and has been
wielded by employers to dissuade workers from unionising activities (Human Rights Watch 2005).
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There is consequently a considerable tension in the US context between labour law and immigra-
tion law, where the latter takes precedence over the former in many instances of exploitation, includ-
ing forced labour. Extensive provision now exists for identified victims of trafficking, including the
availability of T-visa status to enable them to remain and cooperate with prosecution efforts.
However, very few such visas have been granted – only 3269 between 2002 and 2012, a number
well below the limits established by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) first enacted in
2000 (Avendaño and Fanning 2013). This situation reflects the political tenor of the immigration
policy context, where quotas for the identification and removal of undocumented migrants often
create incentives not to look too closely for evidence of trafficking, and demanding criteria are
deployed in considering whether a person qualifies as a victim of trafficking. Immigration policy
thus continues to stand in tension with both labour law and trafficking law in the United States –
the two arenas which are critical to addressing the problems of unfree labour and labour exploitation.
Labour market regulation
The prevailing assumption in several strands of scholarship is that unfree labour occurs the absence of
labour market regulation. Yet, the re-writing of US labour and employment law and changing pat-
terns of enforcement have actively engineered a generalised lack of protection for workers, particu-
larly in low-paid, low-skilled, and low value-added segments of the labour market. States and
municipalities across the country have passed laws restricting the minimum wage, and curtailing
workers’ rights to refuse overtime and unsafe work, access sick leave, and recover unpaid wages.
At both federal and state levels, legislation has been enacted to undermine unions and to restrict
the assertion of collective bargaining rights. By de- and re-regulating the labour market in this
way, the US state has been the institutional architect of a market that increases workers’ vulnerability
to unfreedom, and makes unfree labour a viable business model for firms. We focus here on two key
trends: the overall weakening of legal protections and conditions for workers; and the strategic
deployment of unfree labour as a strategy to discipline ‘free’ workers.
Reshaping the US labour force
As has been well documented in the literature on labour market regulation (Peck 2001, Weil 2014),
the US state has actively reshaped the labour force through policies that have undermined labour
conditions and wages. This has been part of the broader political strategy to bolster corporate profit-
ability that we sketched earlier, which involves deepening the vulnerability of the workforce,
especially in sectors that are spatially fixed and cannot be outsourced overseas (such as agriculture,
services, retail, construction, and care). The increased reliance on migrant labour (documented and
undocumented) as the bedrock of this vulnerable workforce represents a core dimension of this pol-
itical strategy.
At the federal and state levels, legislatures have enacted measures to alter dramatically the com-
pensation and conditions of work. For an overwhelming proportion of US workers, particularly those
in middle- and low-waged sectors, wages have steadily fallen since the 1980s as governments have
supported employers’ commitments and initiatives to cut and suppress wages, and as minimum
wage laws have been overturned across several states. These measures have been highly effective.
From 1979 to 2014, US Bureau of Labor Statistics data indicate that, although real earnings have
increased for the highest earners, earnings have remained ‘basically unchanged’ for the lowest-
paid 10 per cent of earners (2015a: 2). Trends in the 2000s were even more pronounced. According
to a recent study of low wages by the University of California Berkeley Labor Center, ‘inflation-
adjusted wage growth from 2003 to 2013 was either flat or negative for the entire bottom 70
percent of the wage distribution’ (Jacobs et al. 2015; emphasis in the original).
Downward pressure on wages has not simply resulted from abstract market forces, but rather has
been part of purposeful state strategy to spur corporate profitability and growth, and withdraw from
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its traditional role as regulator of the bottom end of the labour market. This strategy has been articu-
lated in a number of ways. Federal and state-level governments have implemented deliberate and
proactive legislative measures to decrease wages, such as by undermining and repealing prevailing
and living wage policies, limiting the numbers of workers covered by such policies, and preventing
cities and states from passing prevailing and living wage policies in the first place. Between 2011 and
2013 alone, over 105 bills were introduced that aimed to weaken or repeal wage standards (National
Employment Law Project 2013). By abandoning commitments to welfare-based protections and insti-
tutionalising policies known as ‘workfare’ (Peck 2001), the state has aggressively withdrawn the
public protections and entitlements for vulnerable workers which had previously curtailed downward
pressures on wages. The US government has removed restrictions previously placed on employers’
strategies to lower labour costs, such as through increased use of offshoring, temporary workers and,
as noted above, employment agencies (Brown et al. 2014, Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000). At the
federal and state levels, there has also been a widespread refusal to modernise labour laws, such
as those guaranteeing workers overtime and leave, with eligibility for overtime declining from 65
per cent of salaried workers in 1975 to 11 per cent in 2014 (Conti 2014). According to one 2015
study, the peak inflation-adjusted value of the minimum wage has declined by 24 per cent since
1968, despite a doubling of productivity and increases in education and skill levels among low-
wage workers (Economic Policy Institute and National Employment Law Project 2015: 1). In contrast
to its more active role in wage policy over much of the twentieth century, the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce captured the position of the US state when it argued in the early 2000s that ‘we don’t think the
government ought to be in the business of setting wages’ (Washington Times 2002).
Declining wages are compounded by endemic wage theft, wherein employers violate wage laws,
overtime, and other employment law with impunity (Bernhardt et al. 2009a). A 2009 study of 4387
workers in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City found that the average low-wage worker lost
$2634 a year in unpaid wages, which totalled 15 per cent of their income (Bernhardt et al. 2009a,
2009b). The prevalence of piece rate wages in many sectors, such as garments, has also enabled
minimum wage laws to be circumvented. Verité reports research from 2013 which indicated that
60 per cent of Los Angeles garment workers were paid less than the minimum wage, and 90 per
cent did not receive overtime pay, even when working in excess of 40 hours per week (Verité
2015: 5). US Department of Labor inspections in Southern California’s garment industry between
2007 and 2012 detected violations in 93 per cent of cases, and $11 million in back wages owed to
some 11,000 workers, and a report in 2010 estimated that $26.2 million per week was withheld or
stolen from garment workers in Los Angeles alone (see also Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000, Verité
2015: 5). Significantly, continuing our previous theme, immigrant workers are nearly twice as likely
to experience employment violations as US-born workers (Bernhardt et al. 2009b).
Declines in workers’ compensation have been paralleled by decreased job quality, including
increases in part-time and insecure and ‘flexible’ employment. Several recent studies have documen-
ted the degradation of work and steep declines in labour standards that have occurred across
many sectors of the US economy, which have often been spurred by strategies on the part of employ-
ers to reduce and evade obligations to labour and employment law through the use of temporary
and contract labour, most often, as noted, in the form of migrant workers (Vosko 2005, 2011,
Appelbaum et al. 2003, Bernhardt et al. 2009b, Kalleberg 2011, Fudge and Strauss 2013). As the
state has re-regulated the labour market to foster ‘flexible’ employment, firms have increasingly
used temporary employment agencies – one of the fastest growing sectors of the US economy
since the 1980s (Peck, Theodore and Ward 2005, Theodore and Peck 2013). The US Government
Accountability Office estimates that 40.4 per cent of the US workforce is now comprised of ‘contin-
gent’ workers, as compared to 30.6 per cent in 2005 (Pofeldt 2015). By comparison, throughout the
1970s, the national number of temporary workers was as low as 250,000 (Theodore and Peck 2013:
27). For workers, the turn toward contingent employment has entailed an increase in job opportu-
nities, but an erosion of job security, lower levels of benefits, and a decreased ability to exert
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rights and contest coercive and unlawful management strategies given the threat and possibility for
immediate termination (ILO 2011, Barrientos 2013).
Finally, the state has weakened the power of unions and of workers to engage in collective action.
Although an anti-union agenda has been firmly in place since the early 1980s, this intensified over the
2000s under pressure from large corporate lobbies, including Americans for Prosperity, National
Association of Manufacturers, and Club for Growth (Lafer 2013: 8–9). At least 25 states have
enacted ‘Right to Work’ statutes (either by law or constitutional amendments), which prohibit
union security agreements and make it illegal for unions to require employees to pay union dues.
These trends intensified in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Several states passed
bills to ‘repair budgets’ that undermined collective bargaining rights. Between 2011 and 2012,
‘four states passed laws restricting the minimum wage, four lifted restrictions on child labor, and
16 imposed new limits on benefits for the unemployed’ (Lafer 2013: 3). There is evidence that this
has been a largely political strategy, inasmuch as there was little correspondence between where
these laws were enacted and where the economic problems were most severe (Lafer 2013: 6). In
the face of these pressures, trade union density has fallen across the US, declining from 27.4 per
cent in 1970 to 10.8 per cent in 2013 (OECD 2015). Such shifts have undermined the role of
unions as workplace regulators, and especially, as advocates for workers’ rights. By extension, they
have created a situation of porousness at the bottom end of the labour market, where vulnerable
workers slide from exploitation to unfreedom and forced labour. It is well understood that unfree
labour is concentrated in sectors and workplaces with no or very low levels of union activity,
where workers are socially isolated and lack political voice, and can be coercively deprived of the
ability collectively to challenge the conditions in which they work (Phillips 2013).
Strategic deployment of unfree labour
An understudied component of labour market restructuring in the US has been the deployment of
unfree labour in ways that have re-shaped the labour force. The primary form this has taken to
date has been the strategic substitution of prison workers for workers circulating within the
market (LeBaron 2015).4 Since 1979, when the government passed the Prison Industry Enhancement
Act re-authorising the use of profitable prison labour by private companies, both the state and federal
prison industries have expanded.5 Prisoners perform a vast range of tasks across several sectors
within and outside prison walls, from building high-end custom motorcycles (California Prison Indus-
try Authority 2015) to milking goats and cows to produce artisanal cheeses sold at US supermarkets
(Alsever 2014). Prisoners working for the state and federal government are paid between $0.00 and
$2.00 per hour, while those who work in the state prison industries for private companies are paid the
minimum wage ($7.25). Yet 80 per cent of their pay can be appropriated by the state towards prison-
ers’ room and board at the prison, victim compensation, and family support.
Two trends in this context are most relevant to our discussion. First, states have begun to substi-
tute prisoners for skilled, well-paid public sector workers in such activities as firefighting and data
entry services for state governments. For instance, in California, which is home to one of the
largest prison industries in the country, over 4400 inmates are currently deployed as firefighters.
Paid between $1.45 and $3.90 per day compared to a non-inmate firefighter’s typical hourly mean
wage of $34.44, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation estimates that the use
of inmates firefighters saves the state $1 billion per year (Lewis 2014, California Department of Cor-
rections and Rehabilitation 2015, US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015b). The use of prison labour in
high-skilled, high-waged industries is a cost-cutting strategy amidst steadily rising costs of incarcera-
tion and persistent fiscal crisis in states like California. But it is also a strategy of labour discipline. Fire-
fighters are heavily unionised, and their unions are among the country’s strongest public employee
organisations. State deployment of prisoners in this industry, therefore, not only demonstrates to
high-skilled, high-paid public employees that they are dispensable and undercuts their bargaining
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power, but also exerts downward pressure on wages and working conditions since prisoners have
little to no ability to contest their compensation or conditions.
Second, prisoners have been substituted for low-skilled, low-waged, migrant workers (who often
have irregular immigration status), particularly in the agricultural sector. In the face of a wave of anti-
immigration laws and crack-downs on undocumented migrant workers in states such as Idaho,
Georgia, and Alabama (Powell 2012), prisoners have been contracted out to farms to work harvesting,
processing, and sorting agricultural products (Millman 2011, Colorado Correctional Industries 2015).
In some states, the use of convict labour in agriculture has become sizable. In Arizona, for instance, in
2011 (the last year for which an estimate is available), inmates worked 1.3 million hours for commer-
cial growers (Millman 2011). As in firefighting, the use of prison labour in the low-waged, agricultural
sector is a strategy of both cost saving and labour discipline. In most states, prisoners are paid
minimum wage, with the government appropriating 80 per cent of prisoner wages towards the
costs of incarceration. At the same time, governments are strategically deploying prison labour to
further erode labour standards and curtail the bargaining power of low-waged, often migrant agri-
cultural workers.
Business regulation
Unfree labour is generally understood to be perpetrated by private individuals and firms. Yet, the
state’s redefinition of its relationship with corporate actors, and changing patterns of regulatory
enforcement over the last several decades, have fostered the context in which individual employers
and firms can impose unfree labour with relative impunity. At both national and state levels, insti-
tutions designed to enforce labour and employment law have had their budgets and staff
reduced, and governments have increasingly devolved authority and responsibility for working con-
ditions onto employers. State strategies have also been oriented to promoting private governance
and (voluntary) corporate self-regulation, often under the umbrella of corporate social responsibility
(CSR). By re-drawing its relationship to firms and significantly devolving regulation for labour stan-
dards to CSR-type initiatives, the US state has created the conditions of possibility for business
models configured around systematic practices of labour exploitation and unfreedom. We focus
here on two key trends: the decline in state-based enforcement of labour standards; and the rise
of private labour governance initiatives.
Declining state-based enforcement of labour standards
At the federal level, the US Department of Labor is tasked with enforcing over 180 labour laws, includ-
ing the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which sets standards for wages and overtime, and the Occu-
pational Safety and Health (OSH) Act, which sets standards for health and safety. Within the
Department of Labor, the two most significant enforcement divisions are the Wage and Hour Div-
ision, which administers the FLSA, the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act,
and several other laws, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which administers
the OSH Act. Each US state also has a Department of Labor tasked with enforcing state-level
labour laws.
There has been a steep decline in federal labour standards enforcement since the late 1970s. The
budgets of the Wage and Hour Division, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and
several other enforcement agencies have stagnated or declined since the 1970s (Weil 2010). Persist-
ent staff cuts and budget cuts have left public labour standards enforcement agencies with fewer
investigators, and able to conduct fewer investigations: between 1998 and 2009, the number of
investigators was reduced by 22 per cent, from 942 to 731, and the number of investigations
handled per investigator fell by 40 per cent, from 53 to 32. At the same time, the number of work-
places and workers in the US has grown, expanding the scope of enforcement for each agency.
The net result is dramatic: David Weil estimates that there has been a net 53 per cent decline in
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investigations per establishment between the late 1970s and 2007s (Weil 2010: 6). To present the
numbers differently, from the time that the federal minimum wage law was established in 1941 to
the end of the 2010s, and in spite of the fact that the number of laws requiring enforcement has
grown dramatically, the number of inspectors per worker had been cut tenfold: from one inspector
for every 11,000 workers in 1941 to one inspector for every 141,000 workers in 2008 (Lafer 2013: 29).
State-level enforcement agencies have experienced similarly significant staff and budget cuts, cur-
tailing their scope and remit (Peck 2001, Weil 2010). In many states, this has occurred as a dimension
of broader budget cuts, while others, such as Ohio, have publicly singled out enforcement of labour
law as especially necessary for de-funding. By rebalancing the budgets in these ways, states have sent
a very clear message to firms: that employers can break labour law with relative impunity, as states
will not enforce these laws, nor safeguard workers covered by them. Employers now face a trivial
chance of being inspected in any given year, such that ‘an employer would have to operate for
1000 years to have even a 1 per cent chance of being audited by Department of Labor inspectors’
(Lafer 2013: 29).
Changing patterns of enforcement mean that when inspections do occur, inspectors are not
necessarily targeting the employers or portions of supply chains in which the worst forms of
abuse and exploitation are known to thrive. As the reduction in the size and role of enforcement
agencies has created very challenging circumstances for inspectorates, agencies have shifted away
from random inspection and monitoring and towards responding to individual complaints (Weil
2010, 2014), and there is little evidence to suggest that complaints target the worst abuses (Weil
and Pyles 2006, Weil 2014). To the contrary, as noted earlier, the worst labour abuses, including
those associated with unfree labour, tend to go unreported given concerns about personal safety
and immigration consequences, lack of knowledge about employment law, or the fear of employer
retaliation (Anner 2012, Hilgert 2013, Verité 2014).
The rise of private labour governance
The active withdrawal of the state from regulatory and enforcement functions has enabled – and pur-
posefully promoted – the rise of a private labour governance regime, which has included a range of
voluntary, industry-led tools and initiatives ranging from codes of conduct to certification schemes
and self-monitoring through private audit firms (Ebenshade 2004, 2012, Taylor 2011, Fransen 2012,
LeBaron and Lister 2015). The US state’s reduction of enforcement of labour standards has been but-
tressed by the claim that companies are largely capable of setting and enforcing their own labour
standards, and where they fall short, it is the job of consumers to hold them accountable. As part
of the broader trends documented in the previous section, governments have increasingly devolved
authority and responsibility for working conditions onto employers, presenting labour and employ-
ment law and standards as a relation between workers and employers, and indeed between employ-
ers and consumers, rather than one that is mediated by and fundamentally shaped by the state
(Esbenshade 2012).
Recent legislation to address forced labour and human trafficking in supply chains has codified
this turn towards corporate self-regulation, effectively writing the state out of labour standards regu-
lation and enforcement. California’s 2012 Transparency in Supply Chains Act paved the way, requiring
manufacturers and retailers with annual global profits exceeding US$1 million and conducting
business in California to disclose the voluntary measures (if any) they are taking to verify their
supply chains against trafficking and forced labour. Similar federal legislation, the Business Supply
Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2015, has recently been introduced and is
under consideration by Congress. This wave of transparency legislation is significant because it con-
tains no binding requirements on firms, nor sanctions for non-compliance (Phillips 2015, Phillips et al.
2016, LeBaron and Rühmkorf 2017). Rather, the role taken on by the state is one of encouraging
businesses to take ethical considerations seriously and facilitating the communication of information
between businesses and consumers.
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As part of this private labour governance regime, companies have increasingly turned to the
use of private audit firms to monitor standards within their supply chains. Although auditors are
often presented as an alternative to state-based enforcement, there are crucial differences
between public and private enforcement agencies. Private auditors do not have powers of inves-
tigation or prosecution. The FLSA gives the US Department of Labor both powers of civil litiga-
tion (e.g. to recover back wages) and criminal prosecution (e.g. to prosecute wilful violations). The
Department of Labor’s enforcement tools includes ‘monetary penalties, temporary restraining
orders to prevent the shipment of “hot goods”, injunctions to compel future compliance, and
a prohibition against intimidating employees who complain’ (Weil 2009: 13). Auditors, by con-
trast, cannot even require companies to open locked drawers (also Esbenshade 2004, 2012,
Allain et al. 2013, LeBaron and Lister 2015). Most private auditing mechanisms rarely, if ever,
cover third-party labour intermediaries, whose key innovation is a blurring of the lines of
accountability and liability between workers and employers, thus leaving the employers of
sizable swathes of the US-working population removed from scrutiny. In short, and unsurpris-
ingly, companies have designed private initiatives which leave the core components of their
business models fully intact.
As has been well documented in the literature on the privatisation of governance (Cutler et al.
1999, Soederberg 2010, Büthe and Mattli 2011, Mayer and Phillips 2017), the turn towards corporate
self-regulation has bolstered the power and authority of firms vis-à-vis the public, and especially,
working populations. Firms have used this power and authority to maximise profit and design
business models and organisations to facilitate future profits and growth. By withdrawing from regu-
latory functions, and facilitating the rise of private labour governance, the state has removed the pro-
tections it previously offered to workers, such as the guarantee that business models needed to
comply with labour laws. This has led to a situation in which firms can exploit workers with relative
impunity, and, where it becomes a feasible and profitable management practice (Crane 2013), con-
figure their business models around unfree labour. For workers at the bottom end of the labour
market, the conjunction of these state policies has heightened their vulnerability to these extreme
forms of labour exploitation.
Conclusion
Our aim in this paper has been to call attention to a weak link in debates about unfree labour in the
contemporary period, namely, the issue of the state. We have contended that states play a critical,
multi-faceted role in creating the conditions in which unfree labour can flourish, and have brought
together a range of perspectives and literatures to set out a framework for locating the state
within a political economy of unfree labour, as a basis on which to call for a greater comparative
research effort. We took the case of the United States as an empirical illustration, focusing on
what we suggest are three of the key critical arenas in the US case: (a) the regulation of labour mobi-
lity; (b) labour market regulation; and (c) business regulation.
Each empirical case is, of course, specific, whether taken in isolation or as a representative of a
particular model of political economy. The detail and focus of comparative research will inevitably
need to capture complex forms of contingency. Table 1 sought to provide a schematic starting
point for this comparative effort, drawing together the key direct and indirect roles that states
play in fostering the conditions of vulnerability and conditions of profitability which combine to facili-
tate unfree labour. Not all of the elements outlined in that scheme apply in any single case, and the
challenge for research is to combine big-picture theoretical work oriented to capturing the place of
states in the political economy of unfree labour with the expansive comparative empirical work that is
needed to underpin it. In each country, region, sector or model of capitalism, where the emphasis is
placed will need to vary, but the point of our summary in Table 1 is that many of its elements will
stretch across different contexts and thus provide the building blocks for a robust comparative
and theoretical effort.
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Let us briefly draw out some examples. To capture the US case, our focus on the regulation of
mobility was oriented towards immigration policy. In some cases, such as the UK, continental
European countries, Australia and others, this focus might fit well in view of the commonalities
in the patterns of unfree labour that prevail among immigrant workers. In other countries, such
as China, Brazil or India, the greater focus would need to fall on the state’s governance of mobility
in an internal context, focusing on how particular dynamics of internal migration render workers
vulnerable to extreme forms of labour exploitation. In other cases, such as in some South-east
Asian and Middle Eastern states, the key issue might be the state’s role in promoting the
‘export’ of labour through organised migration schemes, and the vulnerabilities which are
thereby created for migrant workers outside the state’s borders. Almost across the board, the
focus on labour recruitment will be significant given the expansion of the labour contracting
industry across the world.
Our focus on labour market regulation in the US context highlighted state governance strategies
to achieve a core goal of ‘flexibility’ for business, in ways which have opened up possibilities for
forced labour to become a feasible practice for some businesses. Such a focus travels well to other
national contexts defined by neoliberal states and political economies – the liberal variety of capit-
alism, as it were – in which similar trends and processes have been amply in evidence. But it has
wider resonance, capturing the restructuring of state-capital-labour relations across the vast majority
of countries as they navigate the power relations encased within neoliberal globalisation. Core differ-
ences will be revealing: the focus in China would need to rest on the relationship between rising
wages and the development strategy of ‘upgrading’ in higher value-added production, and labour
shortages and the continued repression of workers’ rights and conditions. Our attention to prison
labour in the US context is more specific, and would draw comparisons with China and some
other countries, but would not be an issue in other contexts. However, it sheds light on the
broader role of the state in underwriting or directly deploying unfree labour, as in the kafala
system in the Middle East, and how this shapes the wider labour market and the place of other
groups of workers within it.
Our discussion of the relationship between states and firms in creating the conditions for unfree
labour is fertile ground for further comparative work, supplementing an already fruitful body of lit-
erature on public/private governance. In the US, we documented a decline of state-based labour
standards enforcement in favour of private governance, which finds parallels as a global trend. But
it is not uniform and is continually evolving: in Brazil, for instance, a much more active – and activist
– role for the state in governing labour standards developed over the 1990s and 2000s, but the pol-
itical climate has more recently swung away from this particular mode of governance. In other parts
of the world, the weak bargaining power of states vis-à-vis TNCs and other private actors has held
state-based enforcement at bay, or brought out its systematic retraction in order to create a
climate deemed favourable to investment, particularly where the investment is premised on low-
cost labour and low regulatory standards.
In short, the comparative ground is fertile, and such an effort to understand the place of the
state in underwriting unfree labour in its diverse forms, in diverse political economies, and in
diverse geographical and social settings would pay dividends for our understanding of how
these forms of labour exploitation flourish. Our final point is to underline the challenge that
we have sought to pose here to existing debates, in which it is frequently presumed that
unfree labour flourishes in the absence of the state, where regulation and enforcement are low
or non-existent. An absence of regulation or the presence of a state with low capacity or political
will for enforcement may well be connected with the incidence of unfree labour, and those con-
ditions are worthy of investigation in themselves. Yet, powerful and active states with high levels
of institutional capacity, such as the US state, are also critical to laying down the conditions in
which unfree labour flourishes. They represent a core dimension of the root causes of the
problem, not simply a potential source of regulatory solutions to it. States, in short, cannot be
written out of the political economy of unfree labour.
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Notes
1. It is important to acknowledge, however, that the empirical basis of much recent Marxist scholarship on unfree
labour has been peasant and ‘deproletarianised’ communities involving rural workers in the developing world.
The invisibility of the state within these debates may be explicable in that states and state actors (via labour
market policy, policing, and even the law) were not always directly involved in people’s daily lives and labour
market circulation.
2. The only available national estimate for prevalence of ‘modern slavery’ in the US comes from the Global Slavery
Index produced by an NGO; however, the Index’s accuracy has been repeatedly questioned by commentators and
academics who have raised compelling criticisms about its methodology and credibility of data. Several organ-
izations – including the US Department of Justice – are currently working to develop stronger prevalence esti-
mates for forced labour within the United States.
3. Author’s interviews, Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division and various NGOs, Washington, DC, March
2012.
4. Prison labour is defined as a form of ‘involuntary servitude’ in the 13th Amendment to the US Constitution and its
use by private businesses is illegal in most countries, including the 178 countries that have ratified the 1930 ILO
Forced Labour Convention. The US has not ratified this convention.
5. See, for instance, Colorado Correctional Industries (https://www.coloradoci.com/) and California Prison Industry
Authority (http://pia.ca.gov/) websites.
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